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WHOSE SPERM IS IT ANYWAYS IN THE WILD,
WILD WEST OF THE FERTILITY INDUSTRY?
Tatiana Elizabeth Posada
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a couple that is unable to conceive a child naturally.
Luckily, they had the money and resources available to them to
conceive a child through assisted reproductive technology (ART),1 so
they decided to start their family through the use of intrauterine
insemination.2 They selected a sperm bank3 and began the arduous
process of selecting a sperm donor who fit the desired traits and
characteristics for their child.4 The sperm bank matched them with an
anonymous donor, Donor 9623, and assured the couple that the donor
was “a healthy male with an IQ of 160, a bachelor’s of science in


J.D. Candidate, 2018, Georgia State University College of Law. Thank you, to Dean Wendy Hensel,
for all of your invaluable time and guidance on this Note; to the Georgia State Law Review, for
perfecting this Note; to my friends and peers in law school, for the consistent inspiration and motivation
you have provided; to Mariya, Sakinah, and Umarah, for being the best mentors I could ask for; to
Jeffrey and Eric, for helping me finish law school by guiding me through one of the most challenging
times in my life; and, above all, thank you Sean, for a patience, an understanding, and a love that is not
of this world.
1. Assisted reproductive technology encompasses technology used to address infertility problems.
See Selecting Your Assisted Reproductive Technology Program, AM. PREGNANCY ASS’N,
http://americanpregnancy.org/infertility/assisted-rerproductive-technology-program/
[https://perma.cc/7RYX-ZFNM] (last visited Sept. 25, 2016).
2. Intrauterine insemination is a less invasive and cheaper fertility treatment than in vitro
fertilization and involves a process of “placing sperm inside the woman’s uterus to facilitate
fertilization.” Intrauterine Insemination: IUI, AM. PREGNANCY ASS’N,
http://americanpregnancy.org/infertility/intrauterine-insemination/ [https://perma.cc/BQ7X-LE6X] (last
visited Sept. 25, 2016).
3. “A sperm bank, also referred to as a [cryobank], is a facility that collects, freezes, and stores
human sperm.” Sperm Banking, AM. PREGNANCY ASS’N,
http://americanpregnancy.org/infertility/sperm-banking/ [https://perma.cc/9ZWR-26MY] (last visited
Sept. 25, 2016).
4. Sperm bank Xytex allows patients looking for a sperm donor to select certain donor attributes
they want their donor to have. Sperm Donor Search, XYTEX CRYO INT’L,
https://www.xytex.com/search-donors [https://perma.cc/69HL-U2MN] (last visited Sept. 25, 2016).
Patients can select physical characteristics including: hair color, eye color, height, and weight. Id. They
can also select nonphysical characteristics including: ethnic origin, religion, blood type, and education
level. Id. Xytex also provides different levels of donors including: Xytex Donors, Xytex Select Donors,
and Xytex Exclusive Donors. Id.

847

Published by Reading Room, 2018

1

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 8

848

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:3

neuroscience, a master’s degree in artificial intelligence, a Ph.D. in
neuroscience engineering on the way, and no criminal history.”5
Given this representation of Donor 9623 as the ideal candidate, the
couple moved forward with the intrauterine insemination procedure
and successfully conceived a child.6 After starting their new family,
the couple accidentally found out the identity of Donor 9623, James
Aggeles,7 and from a simple Internet search, they uncovered the
shocking truth.8 Instead of their ideal neuroscientist donor, the father
of their child was “a college dropout with a felony conviction and
diagnosed schizophrenia.”9
This is Angela Collins and Margaret Hanson’s story.10 This is Jane
Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2’s story.11 This is more than fifteen American,
Canadian, and British families’ stories.12 Angela Collins and
Margaret Hanson believed they had control over the process to start
their family and the ability to select the man that would provide half
of their child’s genetics.13 The sperm bank, Xytex Corporation
(Xytex), also reassured them that this was the case,14 but in June
2014, Angela and Margaret received the rude awakening that this
was indeed not the truth.15 After finding out the true identity of their
sperm donor, the women began notifying other families who also
5. Collins v. Xytex Corp., No. 2015CV259033, 2015 WL 6387328, at *1 (Ga. Super. Ct. Oct. 20,
2015).
6. Id.
7. See id. “Due to a breach of confidentiality, the identity of BGM 9623 was released by Xytex in
June 2014 . . . [as] Defendant James Christian Aggeles.” Id. at *7 n.3.
8. See Complaint at 18, Doe 1 v. Xytex Corp., No. 1:16-CV-01453-TWT, 2017 WL 1036484 (N.D.
Ga. Mar. 17, 2017). Angela Collins and Margaret Hanson discovered information about Aggeles
through an online search. Id.
9. Collins, 2015 WL 6387328, at *1. Several facts referenced in the Collins and Doe 1 pleadings—
and cited throughout this Note—were confirmed through discovery in the other cases against Xytex
nationwide and are on file with the author.
10. Id.
11. See Doe 1, 2017 WL 1036484, at *1–2.
12. See Christine Hauser, Sperm Donor’s Profile Hid Mental Illness and Crime, Lawsuits Say, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/18/world/americas/sperm-donors-profile-hidmental-illness-and-crime-lawsuits-say.html [https://perma.cc/7MEL-BEJB].
13. See Sperm Donor Search, supra note 4. Sperm bank Xytex advertises that patients looking for a
sperm donor have the ability to select certain donor attributes they want their donor to have. Id.
14. Collins, 2015 WL 6387328, at *1.
15. See id.; Complaint, supra note 8, at 18.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol34/iss3/8

2

Posada: Whose Sperm Is It Anyways In The Wild, Wild West Of The Fertility

2018]

WILD WEST OF THE FERTILITY INDUSTRY

849

used the same anonymous sperm donor to conceive their children.16
Donor 9623 has allegedly fathered at least thirty-six children under
his false identity through the purchase, promotion, and sale of his
sperm by Xytex.17
Not only were Angela and Margaret shocked to realize the true
identity of their sperm donor, but on October 20, 2015, they also
found out they would not be able to hold Xytex accountable for its
actions when a Georgia court dismissed their claims in Collins v.
Xytex Corporation.18 Angela and Margaret brought ten different
claims against Xytex: fraud, negligent misrepresentation, strict
liability in products liability, negligence in products liability, breach
of express warranty, breach of an implied warranty, battery,
negligence, unfair business practices, and third party fraud.19 None of
these claims were prenatal tort claims,20 but a Fulton County
Superior Court judge dismissed almost every claim, indicating each
claim was a derivative of the prenatal tort of wrongful birth.21
According to the court’s reasoning, Georgia does not recognize a
prenatal tort for wrongful birth; therefore, any claims that are
derivatives of wrongful birth are also not recognized.22 Similarly,

16. Complaint, supra note 8, at 18.
17. Id. at 6.
18. Collins, 2015 WL 6387328, at *7.
19. Id. at *1.
20. See Tort, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Black’s Law Dictionary defines prenatal
torts as “[l]oosely, any of several torts relating to reproduction, such as those giving rise to wrongfulbirth actions, wrongful-life actions, and wrongful-pregnancy actions.” Id. See also Kate Wevers,
Prenatal Torts and Pre-Implantation Genetic Diagnosis, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 257, 257 (2010).
“Concurrently with the increasing scope of modern prenatal care, courts have recognized a series of
prenatal torts that allow parents, and sometimes children, to pursue claims against their medical
providers for damages flowing from an unwanted birth. These prenatal torts include wrongful birth,
wrongful life, and wrongful pregnancy.” Id.
21. Collins, 2015 WL 6387328, at *7 (dismissing plaintiffs’ claims for fraud, negligent
misrepresentation, strict liability in products liability, negligence in products liability, breach of express
warranty, breach of an implied warranty, battery, negligence, unfair business practices, and third party
fraud after finding all claims impermissibly rooted in a concept of wrongful birth).
22. Id. at *7. The court dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint and amended complaint because “Plaintiffs’
complaint sets forth ten claims, each with a genesis rooted in the concept of wrongful birth, a claim not
recognized under Georgia law.” Id.

Published by Reading Room, 2018

3

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 8

850

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:3

Fulton County State Court also dismissed the majority of a separate
lawsuit against Xytex.23
Alas, not only have state courts arrived at this analysis and
conclusion, a federal court in Georgia has also dismissed all claims in
two separate cases against Xytex for the same reasons.24 In Doe 1 v.
Xytex Corporation, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia determined the lawsuit against Xytex was a
wrongful birth case even though the plaintiffs brought eleven causes
of action, none of which were prenatal tort claims.25 In addition to the
two lawsuits filed in Georgia state courts, on December 7, 2016,
there were a total of six federal lawsuits regarding Donor 9623
pending against Xytex, and these suits were filed across the nation in
California, Florida, Georgia, and Ohio.26 These cases will
collectively be referred to as “the Xytex cases” throughout this Note.
In Georgia, these cases have left families without any ability to hold
Xytex accountable for its actions and have allowed Xytex to continue
to operate in the reproductive health care realm however it chooses.
The purpose of this Note is to assess the need for Georgia to
reevaluate prenatal torts due to advances in ART procedures, the
increase in use of this technology,27 and the lack of sperm bank
regulations, which have now resulted in the problem evidenced by
the Xytex cases. Part I examines the history behind the creation of
the three main prenatal torts: wrongful birth, wrongful life, and
23. Greg Land, 2 More Suits Over Flawed Sperm Donor Tossed, DAILY REP. (Mar. 21, 2017),
https://www.law.com/dailyreportonline/almID/1202781717725/ [https://perma.cc/C28B-S6GF].
24. Id.
25. See Doe 1 v. Xytex Corp., No. 1:16-CV-1453-TWT, 2017 WL 1036484, at *2–3 (N.D. Ga. Mar.
17, 2017) (dismissing the eleven claims as derivatives of wrongful birth); Complaint, supra note 8, at
21–29 (listing the eleven causes of action as follows: fraud, negligent misrepresentation, strict liability,
products liability negligence, breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, battery,
negligence, unfair business practices, specific performance, and false advertising).
26. In re Xytex Corp. Sperm Donor Prod. Liab. Litig., 223 F. Supp. 3d 1351, 1352–53 (J.P.M.L.
2016).
27. Saswati Sunderam et al., Assisted Reproductive Technology Surveillance–United States, 2010,
CDC (Dec. 6, 2013), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss6209a1.htm
[https://perma.cc/B4GH-NZTG] (last visited Dec. 17, 2016). “Since the first U.S. infant conceived with
Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) was born in 1981, both the use of advanced technologies to
overcome infertility and the number of fertility clinics providing ART services have increased steadily
in the United States.” Id.
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wrongful conception, followed by an examination of the current
sperm bank regulations. Part II analyzes Georgia’s evaluation of
prenatal torts, Georgia’s policy considerations when evaluating
prenatal torts, Georgia’s interpretation of claims against sperm banks,
and Georgia’s limited sperm bank regulations. Part III examines
several proposals to remedy this issue, while accounting for
Georgia’s policy concerns, to ensure the state is protecting its
citizens’ rights and deterring sperm banks from engaging in
fraudulent business practices.
I. Background
As evidenced by the Xytex cases, the advancement of ART and the
lack of sperm bank regulations have resulted in a need to reexamine
Georgia’s approach to prenatal tort claims and sperm banks. As
technology advances, it is important for states to adapt to these
changes to continue protecting fundamental rights surrounding
decisions to have a child. This section provides a brief introduction to
prenatal torts generally, an explanation of prenatal torts in Georgia, a
brief introduction to current sperm bank regulations, and an
explanation of the convergence of prenatal torts and sperm bank
regulations.
A. Prenatal Torts
In the 1973 case Roe v. Wade,28 the Supreme Court of the United
States determined a woman possesses a constitutional right to “make
an informed decision regarding the procreative options available to
her.”29 After the Supreme Court held that a woman has a right to
terminate her pregnancy given temporal limitations,30 the nation

28. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (finding the constitutional right to privacy “is broad
enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy”).
29. Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 346 (N.H. 1986).
30. See id. (referencing Roe v. Wade). The Court found “[d]uring the first trimester of her pregnancy,
a woman may make this decision as she sees fit, free from State interference.” Id.
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began to see the development of prenatal torts, to which states have
responded differently.31
In general, a tort is “a civil wrong, other than [a] breach of
contract, for which a remedy may be obtained.”32 There are many
different types of torts including, but not limited to, intentional torts
and negligent torts, which include claims like medical malpractice.33
A prenatal tort is simply a type of tort relating to reproduction34 that
is usually characterized as a negligence claim or, more specifically, a
medical malpractice claim.35 The primary prenatal torts include
wrongful birth actions, wrongful life actions, and wrongful
conception or wrongful pregnancy actions.36
1. Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life
Generally, wrongful birth is “[a] lawsuit brought by parents against
a doctor for failing to advise them prospectively about the risks of
their having a child with birth defects.”37 A wrongful birth claim is
based on the argument that had the doctor properly advised the
parents of the child’s risk for birth defects, the parents would have
opted to not conceive or have an abortion, rather than proceed with
the pregnancy.38 Wrongful birth generally involves a planned
31. See id. at 345. In Justice Batchelder’s opinion, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire
acknowledged Roe’s recognition of a woman’s right to an abortion as one of “[t]wo developments [that]
help explain the trend toward judicial acceptance of wrongful birth actions.” Id.
32. Tort, supra note 20.
33. See id.; Malpractice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
34. Tort, supra note 20.
35. See, e.g., Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544, 550 (D.S.C. 1981) (categorizing wrongful
birth as within the traditional boundaries of negligence like any medical malpractice action); Burke v.
Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1, 2 (Mass. 1990) (categorizing a negligently performed sterilization, which is a
wrongful conception claim, as a medical malpractice claim); Pierce v. Piver, 262 S.E.2d 320, 321 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1980) (categorizing wrongful conception as a medical malpractice claim under the umbrella of
negligence).
36. Tort, supra note 20; see also Caroline Crosby Owings, The Right to Recovery for Emotional
Distress Arising from a Claim for Wrongful Birth, 32 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 143, 146 (2008).
37. Wrongful-Birth Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
38. See PREYESH K. MANIKAL, MEDICAL TORTS IN GEORGIA: A HANDBOOK ON STATE AND
FEDERAL LAW § 2:13 (2016). Wrongful birth claims involve “the treating physician’s failure to give the
parents of a potentially impaired child the opportunity to abort the child.” Id. These claims are “brought
by the parents of an impaired child for a child that would have otherwise been aborted.” Id.
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pregnancy resulting in a child born with a genetic deformity or
disability.39 Some states recognize wrongful birth actions,40 while
other states have expressly prohibited the cause of action.41 Where
wrongful birth is recognized, damages usually include “the
extraordinary costs associated with raising an unhealthy child until
the child attains the age of majority, these same costs beyond the age
of the child’s majority, damages for parental emotional harm, and
compensation for comprehensive child rearing costs.”42
A wrongful life claim is essentially the same as a wrongful birth
claim; however, in a wrongful life claim it is the child or someone on
behalf of the child, rather than the parent, who is alleging pain and
suffering.43 Consider the following hypothetical: Dr. A fails to
prospectively warn patient B about the risk of her having a child born
with birth defects, so B conceives child C and proceeds with the
pregnancy. C is then born with birth defects. B (the mother) would
39. See Julie F. Kowitz, Not Your Garden Variety Tort Reform: Statutes Barring Claims for
Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth Are Unconstitutional Under the Purpose Prong of Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 235, 253 (1995).
40. E.g., Keel v. Banach, 624 So. 2d 1022, 1031 (Ala. 1993) (recognizing a cause of action for
wrongful birth in Alabama); Arche v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 798 P.2d 477, 480 (Kan. 1992) (recognizing
a cause of action for wrongful birth in Kansas); Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825, 829–30 (Va. 1982)
(recognizing a cause of action for wrongful birth in Virginia).
41. William C. Duncan, Statutory Responses to “Wrongful Birth” and “Wrongful Life” Actions, 14
LIFE & LEARNING 3, 3 (2004), http://www.uffl.org/Vol14/Duncan-04.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5Z8KFNS]. Two examples include Idaho and Michigan. Idaho’s statute prohibiting wrongful birth reads as
follows: “A cause of action shall not arise, and damages shall not be awarded, on behalf of any person,
based on the claim that but for the act or omission of another, a person would not have been permitted to
have been born alive but would have been aborted.” Id. at 5. Michigan’s law reads as follows: “A person
shall not bring a civil action on a wrongful birth claim that, but for an act or omission of the defendant, a
child or children would not or should not have been born.” Id. at 6. Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, North
Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Utah all have similar statutes expressly prohibiting wrongful
birth. Id. at 5–11.
42. Kathleen A. Mahoney, Malpractice Claims Resulting from Negligent Preconception Genetic
Testing: Do These Claims Present a Strain of Wrongful Birth or Wrongful Conception, and Does the
Categorization Even Matter?, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 782, 782 (2006).
43. Wrongful-Life Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Wrongful life is a “lawsuit
brought by or on behalf of a child with birth defects, alleging that but for the doctor-defendant’s
negligent advice, the parents would not have conceived the child or, if they had, would have aborted the
fetus to avoid the pain and suffering resulting from the child’s congenital defects.” Id.; see also James
Bopp, Jr. et al., The “Rights” and “Wrongs” of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life: A Jurisprudential
Analysis of Birth Related Torts, 27 DUQ. L. REV. 461, 461–62 (1989). “A wrongful birth action is
brought by parents seeking damages . . . . The wrongful life action is distinct from the wrongful birth
action in that a wrongful life claim is brought by or on behalf of a child with disabilities.” Id.
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bring a wrongful birth claim against Dr. A, while C (the child) would
bring a wrongful life claim against Dr. A. Both A and C would be
arguing that, but for Dr. A’s negligent advice, B either would not
have conceived or would have aborted C, avoiding the pain and
suffering resulting from the birth defect. While a variety of states
recognize wrongful birth, only four states recognize wrongful life as
a valid claim.44 Where wrongful life is recognized, damages usually
include special damages for costs to the child for the extraordinary
expenses necessary to treat the birth defect.45 A detailed discussion of
wrongful life is beyond the scope of this Note because the Xytex
cases specifically focus on the distinction between wrongful birth and
wrongful conception.
2. Wrongful Conception
The third and most widely-accepted prenatal tort is wrongful
conception.46 Generally, a wrongful conception or wrongful
pregnancy action is “[a] lawsuit brought by a parent for damages
resulting from a pregnancy following a failed sterilization
[procedure].”47 Where wrongful conception is recognized, damages
usually include the mother’s medical expenses and “emotional
distress damages associated with pregnancy and childbirth,” but most
courts have declined to expand “such damages to the costs of raising
the unexpected child to adulthood.”48 Consider the following
44. Kowitz, supra note 39, at 255. Courts have upheld the validity of wrongful birth claims almost
universally, while wrongful life claims have not fared as well. Id. (noting “only four state courts have
recognized” wrongful life—California, Colorado, New Jersey, and Washington).
45. Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 966 (Cal. 1982); Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Empire Cas. Co., 713 P.2d
384, 394 (Colo. App. 1985); Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 757 (N.J. 1984); Harbeson v. ParkeDavis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 496–97 (Wash. 1983).
46. See Don C. Smith, Jr., Cause of Action Against Physician for Wrongful Conception or Wrongful
Pregnancy, in 3 CAUSES OF ACTION 83 § 4 (1984, 2017 update). The list of jurisdictions that recognize
wrongful conception includes: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, District
of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id.
47. Wrongful-Pregnancy Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
48. Wendy F. Hensel, The Disabling Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions, 40 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 151 (2005).
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hypothetical: Dr. X performs a tubal sterilization procedure49 on
patient Y to prevent future pregnancies, but Y conceives a child
despite undergoing the procedure. Y would bring a wrongful
conception claim against Dr. X for performing the procedure
negligently, resulting in her conception of a child she did not want to
conceive.50
B. Prenatal Torts in Georgia
Interestingly, several states that expressly prohibit a wrongful birth
claim recognize wrongful conception as a valid claim.51 Georgia is
one of those states. The Georgia General Assembly has not expressly
recognized wrongful birth, and the Supreme Court of Georgia refuses
to recognize this prenatal tort absent the legislature’s express
mandate.52 The court, however, has recognized wrongful conception
as a valid claim that is a subset of malpractice.53 It has used the
traditional tort analysis to differentiate these two prenatal torts.
Since prenatal torts are usually considered negligence claims or
medical malpractice torts, to bring a prenatal tort claim, an individual
must satisfy the four elements required in the traditional negligence

49. In a tubal sterilization procedure, “the fallopian tubes are removed or cut and tied with special
thread, closed shut with bands or clips, sealed with an electric current, or blocked with scar tissue
formed by small implants” to prevent pregnancy. Sterilization by Laparoscopy, AM. C. OBSTETRICIANS
& GYNECOLOGISTS, http://www.acog.org/Patients/FAQs/Sterilization-by-Laparoscopy
[https://perma.cc/FS9R-CZSP] (last visited Mar. 4, 2018).
50. See, e.g., Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 760–61 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974) (finding a wrongful
pregnancy claim where a woman sued a physician for negligently performing a tubal sterilization
procedure consisting of a bilateral tubal ligation, which resulted in an unplanned pregnancy).
51. See, e.g., Duncan, supra note 41, at 5–7. Some examples include Idaho, Michigan, and
Minnesota. Idaho specifically distinguishes the legislative prohibition against a cause of action for
wrongful birth from a cause of action for wrongful conception. Id. at 5. Michigan differentiates a cause
of action for wrongful birth from a cause of action for wrongful conception by providing limited
damages for wrongful conception. Id. at 6. Minnesota “specifically allows for malpractice actions based
on defective contraception or sterilization.” Id. at 7.
52. Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Grp. v. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d 557, 560 (Ga. 1990) (finding a
breakdown in the traditional tort analysis of a wrongful birth claim and, “[i]n spite of the widespread
recognition and, in fact, because of that recognition and the confusion which has followed in its wake,”
holding “that ‘wrongful birth’ actions shall not be recognized in Georgia absent a clear mandate for such
recognition by the legislature”).
53. Fulton-Dekalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 314 S.E.2d 653, 654 (Ga. 1984).
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analysis.54 The individual must prove: (1) the tortfeasor had a duty to
the individual; (2) the tortfeasor breached the tortfeasor’s duty to the
individual; (3) the tortfeasor’s actions caused the individual’s injury;
and (4) the individual sustained some injury.55 Thus, wrongful birth
and wrongful conception claims must be able to satisfy these four
elements to be recognizable claims. The Supreme Court of Georgia
has determined it is impossible to satisfy all of these elements in a
wrongful birth claim; therefore, it cannot recognize wrongful birth as
a valid claim.56 The court has found it is, however, possible to satisfy
all four traditional tort analysis elements in a wrongful conception
claim; therefore, it can recognize wrongful conception as a valid
claim.57
C. Applying the Traditional Tort Analysis to Wrongful Birth
The Supreme Court of Georgia has defined wrongful birth as a
claim where the parents of an impaired child bring a lawsuit alleging
“but for the treatment or advice provided by the defendant, the
parents would have aborted the fetus, thereby preventing the birth of
the child.”58 In other words, the child would not have been born but
for the physician’s actions. If the child was aborted, the parents
would not have had to incur the mental and emotional strains of
having a disabled child, nor would they have the monetary expenses
54. See Negligence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Black’s Law Dictionary defines
negligence as a tort that is usually “expressed in terms of the following elements: duty, breach of duty,
causation, and damages,” and it includes malpractice (professional negligence) as a claim under the
umbrella of negligence. Id.; see also Hutton Brown et al., Legal Rights and Issues Surrounding
Conception, Pregnancy, and Birth, 39 VAND. L. REV. 597, 727 (1986) (explaining how the broad
acceptance of wrongful pregnancy actions (wrongful conception actions) stems from its similarity to
medical malpractice and the courts’ ability to “identify and consider the traditional tort elements of duty,
breach, proximate cause, and injury”); Owings, supra note 36, at 148 (explaining how “most
jurisdictions agree that the cause of action [for wrongful birth] involves, at a minimum, the prima facie
elements of negligence: duty, breach of duty, causation, and injury”).
55. See Zaldivar v. Prickett, 774 S.E.2d 688, 693–94 (Ga. 2015) (restating the unquestionable rule
“that liability in tort requires proof that the defendant owed a legal duty, that she breached that duty, and
that her breach was a proximate cause of the injury sustained by the plaintiff”).
56. See Abelson, 398 S.E.2d at 560–61.
57. See Graves, 314 S.E.2d at 654.
58. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d at 560.
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associated with the care of a disabled child.59 Further, the child
would not have had to suffer the mental, emotional, and health issues
associated with being disabled.60
The Supreme Court of Georgia first considered wrongful birth in
Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Group v. Abelson.61 In Abelson, the
plaintiffs’ child was born with Down syndrome, and they brought a
lawsuit against the physician who provided the postconception
obstetrical care and treatment.62 The plaintiffs filed the suit on behalf
of themselves and their daughter alleging the defendants failed to
properly counsel the plaintiffs about the risks of the pregnancy and
failed to inform them about the availability of an amniocentesis
test.63 The plaintiffs sought personal damages for the pregnancy and
delivery; pain and suffering, mental and emotional anguish, lost
wages; loss of consortium; and the “reasonable and necessary costs
of rearing, educating and otherwise providing for [their child]
including medical expenses.”64 They also sought damages on behalf
of their child.65
When applying the traditional tort analysis to the wrongful birth
claim, the court found that, in general, plaintiffs can satisfy the first
two elements, duty and breach, in such a cause of action.66 Duty and
breach can be satisfied because medical practitioners have a duty to
disclose information regarding genetic deformities to their patients,
and by not disclosing this information the physician breaches the

59. See id. at 558. Plaintiffs sought damages for “pain and suffering; mental and emotional
anguish . . . and the ‘reasonable and necessary costs of rearing, educating and otherwise providing for
[their child] including medical expenses’” due to the genetic disorder. Id.
60. See id. Plaintiffs also sought damages on behalf of their daughter for her own pain and suffering,
as well as the costs to her for her medical expenses associated with the genetic disorder. Id.
61. See id. at 559–61 (explaining the court’s precedent recognizing wrongful conception as a valid
tort and detailing how wrongful birth is different from wrongful conception to explain why the court
will now choose not to extend the same ruling to wrongful birth).
62. Id. at 558.
63. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d at 558.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 560 (noting “[t]he first two prongs of the four pronged traditional tort analysis, those of
duty and breach, do not present so great a problem” when applying the traditional tort principles to
wrongful birth).
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physician’s duty to the patient.67 However, causation and damages
are the two elements the court determined plaintiffs cannot prove
when applying the traditional tort analysis to wrongful birth claims.68
1. Causation and Damages Preventing the Recognition of
Wrongful Birth
First, the court found plaintiffs cannot successfully establish
causation in a wrongful birth action because the physician’s failure to
disclose the possibility of genetic deformities cannot be the “but for”
cause of the child’s genetic deformity;69 a child’s development and
genetic composition is inherited from the child’s parents, and a
failure to disclose certain information does not change this fact.70
However, even if the plaintiffs could satisfy causation, the court
found the traditional tort analysis would still fail because plaintiffs
cannot prove damages.71 In a wrongful birth action, plaintiffs are
claiming the child as their injury, but the Supreme Court of Georgia
is unwilling to define a child as an injury because of the policy
implications of such an action.72 The court determined that without
defining the child as an injury, plaintiffs cannot prove damages in a
wrongful birth case. Thus, plaintiffs cannot prove the third or fourth
elements—causation and damages—of the traditional tort analysis
that the court requires to recognize wrongful birth as a valid claim.
67. See id. at 560–61 (noting “a physician has been recognized to have a generalized duty to impart
relevant information to a patient concerning his or her medical condition”).
68. Id. at 561 (noting the traditional tort analysis begins to break down with the injury prong and
breaks down even further with the causation prong).
69. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d at 561.
70. Id.
The [impairment] is genetic and not the result of any injury negligently
inflicted by the [defendants]. In addition it is incurable and was incurable
from the moment of conception. Thus the [defendants’] alleged negligent
failure to detect it during prenatal examination cannot be considered a
cause of the condition by analogy to those cases in which the doctor has
failed to make a timely diagnosis of a curable disease. The child’s
[impairment] is an inexorable result of conception and birth.
Id. (quoting Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 816 (N.Y. 1978) (Watchler, J. dissenting)).
71. See id.
72. See id. at 561, 563; see also Campbell v. United States, 795 F. Supp. 1127, 1129 (N.D. Ga.
1991) (noting the Supreme Court of Georgia’s refusal “to recognize the life of a child as a legal injury”).
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2. The Policy Considerations Preventing the Recognition of
Wrongful Birth
Ultimately, the court was unwilling to recognize wrongful birth as
a legitimate tort claim because of the policy implications associated
with finding causation and damages in such a claim.73 In Abelson, the
court explained the policy considerations and long-range
consequences of recognizing wrongful birth, which are important to
note since they ultimately resulted in the decision against recognizing
a cause of action for wrongful birth.74
First, the court expressed policy concerns regarding causation.
Finding causation in wrongful birth would increase obstetricians’
exposure to liability and thus increase medical malpractice claims
against obstetricians, which the court believed was bad for the
public.75 The court also feared that this increased burden on
obstetricians—trying to determine what information they should
share with patients—would encourage physicians to recommend an
abortion where there is any chance of the child having a genetic
abnormality, simply to avoid liability.76
Second, the court expressed policy concerns regarding damages.
Finding damages involves the policy implication of life, and such
policy issues enter the realm of philosophical questions regarding

73. See Abelson, 398 S.E.2d at 563.
74. See id. at 560 nn.4–5 (discussing the philosophical implications on life and the policy
implications on obstetricians’ liability exposure that would result from recognizing a cause of action for
wrongful birth).
75. Id. at 560 n.5 (finding “[a] valid concern underlying the legislative curtailment of ‘wrongful
birth’ actions is the probability that ‘wrongful birth’ claims will give rise to increased medical
malpractice litigation, with obstetricians’ liability exposure being so broad as to inhibit the practice of
obstetrics and thereby damage the public good”). The court noted that this policy concern is of particular
importance to Georgia because in “its 1990 session, the General Assembly [enacted] a statute
establishing a gubernatorial commission to investigate an ‘obstetrical crisis,’ . . . created by ‘a
significant decrease in the number of physicians who practice obstetrics,’” which proved to the court the
need for “a thorough assessment of all of the public policy considerations involved in recognition of
‘wrongful birth.’” Id.
76. Id. at 563 n.9 (quoting Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 535 (N.C. 1985)) (noting
“[i]nevitably [recognizing wrongful birth] will place increased pressure upon physicians to take the
‘safe’ course by recommending abortion” to avoid liability when determining what information is
important to provide to parents to obtain their informed consent).
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life, which extends beyond the court’s responsibility.77 There is a
strong belief that every child’s life is precious, and the Supreme
Court of Georgia “recoil[s]” from recognizing the birth of a child as
an injury.78 In general, there are also issues surrounding the policy
implications on the disabled community, specifically because
recognizing a cause of action for wrongful birth, in essence, places a
value judgment on living with a disability versus not living at all.79
This can have negative effects not only on the child’s psyche, but
also on the disabled community’s psyche.80
The Supreme Court of Georgia believes these types of policy
questions are only proper for the legislature to examine as a “forum
wherein all of the issues, policy considerations and long-range
consequences involved in recognition of the novel concept of a
‘wrongful birth’ cause of action can be thoroughly and openly
debated and ultimately decided.”81 Thus, until the Georgia General
Assembly decides to recognize wrongful birth as a valid claim, the
claim will continue to fail in Georgia.
D. Applying the Traditional Tort Analysis to Wrongful
Conception
Although the Supreme Court of Georgia has recoiled from
recognizing wrongful birth, it has taken a different approach with
77. See id. at 559, 560 n.4 (quoting Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 314 S.E.2d 653, 655 (Ga.
1984)) (noting that evaluating the costs of raising a child with an impairment to find damages in a
wrongful birth claim requires the court to “consider the value which our society places upon human life
in general and on the lives of children in particular”). The court also noted it is not the place of the court
to put a valuation on the difference between a life born with an impairment versus having never been
born at all. See Abelson, 398 S.E.2d at 560 n.4.
78. Id. at 559 (quoting Graves, 314 S.E.2d at 655) (noting the court “instinctively recoil[s] from the
notion that parents may suffer a compensable injury on the birth of a child”).
79. Hensel, supra note 47, at 144 (discussing how “[j]uries in such actions are required to evaluate
whether a particular disability is so horrible, from the nondisabled perspective, as to make plausible the
choice of abortion or contraconception by the parent, or non-existence by the disabled child”).
80. See generally id. at 171–81; see also Letter from Autistic Self Advocacy Network to Anthony
Romero, Exec. Director, ACLU, and Susan Herman, President, ACLU (May 25, 2012),
http://autisticadvocacy.org/2012/05/letter-to-aclu-on-wrongful-birth-and-life-statements/
[https://perma.cc/W9SQ-MGTT].
81. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d at 563.
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wrongful conception claims. The basis for a wrongful conception
claim differs from wrongful birth claims because these prenatal torts
generally involve an unplanned pregnancy typically resulting in a
healthy child.82 The parents are arguing that but for the physician’s
negligence, the mother would never have conceived the child, rather
than arguing the mother would have aborted the child had she known
of a genetic deformity.83 In other words, the action is for the lost
opportunity to avoid a pregnancy, rather than the lost opportunity to
terminate the pregnancy.84 Accordingly, the Supreme Court of
Georgia views these two prenatal torts differently.85
1. Causation and Damages Resulting in the Recognition of
Wrongful Conception
The Supreme Court of Georgia first considered wrongful
conception in Fulton-Dekalb Hospital Authority v. Graves.86 In
Graves, the plaintiff gave birth to a child with a clubfoot after having
her physician perform a sterilization procedure specifically to prevent
childbirth.87 The plaintiff filed suit for negligence and fraudulent
misrepresentation.88 The court framed the case as one of first
82. Mahoney, supra note 42, at 775 (noting “[w]rongful birth cases tend to involve a planned
pregnancy, postconception negligence, negligent neonatal testing or care, the birth of an unhealthy child
and a parental action for the lost opportunity to terminate the pregnancy,” while “[w]rongful conception
cases, in contrast, typically involve preconception malpractice, an unplanned pregnancy resulting in the
birth [of] a healthy child, negligence in sterilizations, abortion procedures, pregnancy diagnoses or
contraception administration and a parental action for the lost opportunity to avoid a pregnancy”).
83. See Don C. Smith, Jr., supra note 46, § 2 (noting the focus for injury in a wrongful conception
claim “is at the point of conception”); see also Lisa A. Podewils, Traditional Tort Principles and
Wrongful Conception Child-Rearing Damages, 73 B.U. L. REV. 407, 425 n.2 (1993).
Wrongful conception or wrongful pregnancy lawsuits may be distinguished
from wrongful birth . . . actions. In wrongful birth lawsuits, the parents of
unhealthy infants seek to recover the cost of caring for the disabled infant.
Recovery is based on the premise that the parents would have aborted if
they had known that the child was going to be disabled, or that the child’s
impairment was caused by the physician’s negligence.
Id.
84. Mahoney, supra note 42, at 775.
85. See Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 314 S.E.2d 653, 653–54 (Ga. 1984).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 654.
88. Id.
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impression presenting two questions: “(1) [w]hether Georgia will
recognize a cause of action for wrongful pregnancy or wrongful
conception and, if so, (2) whether the damages recoverable include
the cost of rearing and educating the child.”89
When applying the traditional tort analysis to the wrongful
conception claim, the court found that, in general, plaintiffs can
satisfy all four of the required elements in the traditional tort analysis.
The court recognized wrongful conception as a subset of malpractice
that does satisfy duty, breach, causation, and damages.90 Duty and
breach can be satisfied because the medical practitioner has a duty to
perform a procedure to prevent pregnancy, and the practitioner
breaches that duty by negligently performing the procedure, which
results in an unplanned pregnancy.91 Causation is satisfied because
but for the practitioner’s negligence in performing the procedure, the
child would never have been conceived.92 Lastly, the damages
element is satisfied because damages in a wrongful conception claim
can be tailored to revolve around the procedure itself and the mother
herself, rather than the child.93 The court chose to limit damages in
this way by including in the damages calculation the mother’s costs
for the procedure, for medical complications, and for the delivery,
while refusing to include the cost of raising the child.94 Including the
cost of raising the child would require the court to make value
judgments on life.95 Limiting damages to the procedure, however,
allowed the court to find damages satisfied when applying the
traditional tort analysis to wrongful conception without implicating
policy considerations regarding life.96 Thus, because wrongful
89. Id. at 653–54.
90. Id. at 654 (finding “no reason why an action for wrongful pregnancy or wrongful conception
should not be recognized in Georgia [because] [s]uch an action is no more than a species of malpractice
which allows recovery from a tortfeasor in the presence of an injury caused by intentional or negligent
conduct”).
91. See Graves, 314 S.E.2d at 654.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 654–55.
95. Id. at 655.
96. See id. at 654–55 (ultimately recognizing a cause of action for wrongful pregnancy because
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conception satisfies the traditional tort analysis, the courts recognizes
it as a valid claim in Georgia.
2. No Policy Considerations Preventing the Recognition of
Wrongful Conception
In addition to satisfying all four elements of the traditional tort
analysis, there were no policy considerations that prevented the
Supreme Court of Georgia from recognizing wrongful conception as
a tort. In Graves, the court only provided a limited analysis in its
opinion recognizing wrongful conception as a valid claim in
Georgia.97 However, the court did briefly mention a few policy
concerns that have been argued against recognizing this prenatal tort,
including the following: “recognition of such a cause of action would
open the door to fraudulent claims, that the injury is remote from the
negligence, [and] that recovery would be out of proportion to the
defendant’s culpability.”98 But, rather than expounding upon any of
these concerns, the court simply dismissed them by acknowledging
that these same arguments have been made against countless other
tort claims, and they have all been “dealt with in the course of
traditional tort litigation.”99 The only policy concern the court took
the time to consider was the implication of including the costs of
raising the child in the damages calculation for a wrongful
conception claim.100 It ultimately rejected this request because “given
the values cherished by our society, a parent cannot be said to have
suffered an injury in the birth of a child,” and including the costs of
raising the child in the damages calculation is synonymous with
damages limited to “expenses for the unsuccessful medical procedure which led to conception or
pregnancy, for pain and suffering, medical complications, costs of delivery, lost wages, and loss of
consortium” are consistent with damages under other medical malpractice claims and do not deviate
from traditional tort remedies).
97. Compare Graves, 314 S.E.2d at 653–56 (recognizing wrongful conception as a valid cause of
action in a three-page opinion), with Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Grp. v. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d at
557, 557–67 (Ga. 1990) (declining to recognize wrongful birth as a valid cause of action in a ten-page
opinion).
98. Graves, 314 S.E.2d at 654.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 655–56.
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considering the child an injury.101 The court ultimately concluded
that all of these considerations do not prevent the recognition of
wrongful conception as a valid cause of action, so long as damages
are limited to not include the costs of raising the child.102
E. The Convergence of Prenatal Torts and Sperm Bank
Regulations
As ART rapidly advances,103 the law governing this technology
continues to lag.104 Advances in technology, such as genetic testing
and in vitro fertilization, have only recently pushed some states to
consider sperm bank regulation.105 The Xytex cases illustrate the
convergence of prenatal torts and sperm bank regulation. There have
been few cases against sperm banks for negligence and medical
malpractice.106 The Xytex cases, however, depict how sperm banks
may be named as defendants in various lawsuits, but the absence of
statutory guidelines107—combined with judicial interpretations of
101. Id.
102. See id. at 654–55 (finding “no reason why an action for wrongful pregnancy or wrongful
conception should not be recognized in Georgia” but limiting damages to not include the cost of rearing
the child).
103. See In Vitro Maturation: IVM, AM. PREGNANCY ASS’N,
http://americanpregnancy.org/infertility/ivm-in-vitro-maturation/ [https://perma.cc/8GFW-3PM2] (last
visited Sept. 25, 2016). Advances in technology have led to a variety of infertility treatments, such as
zygote intrafallopian transfer, intracytoplasmic sperm injection, gamete intrafallopian tube transfer,
donor insemination, and in vitro maturation. Id.
104. Collins v. Xytex Corp., No. 2015CV259033, 2015 WL 6387328, at *2 (Ga. Super. Ct. Oct. 20,
2015).
Because the science that brought us the wonders (and attendant moral and
legal challenges) of artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, and
embryo transplantation has developed much faster than the laws we rely on
to regulate such procedures (and the business models that have sprung up
around them), discussion of the issues raised by this litigation is
complicated and careful use of terminology is critical.
Id.
105. See Daniel J. Penofsky, Liability of Sperm Banks, in 50 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1, § 1 (1994, updated
2017) (discussing how “[o]ver the past decade, remarkable advances have been made in the fields of
cryogenics and molecular biology” leading to the proliferation of sperm banks, yet “there is an
astonishing absence of state and federal laws regulating sperm banks and artificial insemination
practitioners” and less than half of the states have enacted regulations).
106. Amy L. Fracassini, The Regulation of Sperm Banks and Fertility Doctors: A Cry for
Prophylactic Measures, 8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 275, 284 (1992).
107. Id. at 279 (noting sperm bank facilities are vulnerable to lawsuits for various claims regarding
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prenatal torts—creates a gap in which sperm banks largely operate
invisibly, and are untouchable, in the reproductive health care realm.
The United States is known as the “Wild, Wild West”108 of the
fertility industry because, for the most part, sperm banks across the
nation currently operate unregulated.109 The federal government’s
sperm bank regulations are very limited in scope.110 The United
States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) only requires sperm
banks to specifically screen for a limited number of diseases
including: human immunodeficiency virus, Hepatitis B virus,
Hepatitis C virus, human transmissible spongiform encephalopathy,
treponema pallidum, communicable disease risks associated with
xenotransplantation, viable leukocyte-rich cells, and infection due to
limited communicable diseases of the genitourinary tract.111 Sperm
wrongful insemination, transmission of diseases, and breach of privacy rights or duties of confidentiality
and “state legislatures must address the legal duties of those performing inseminations and delineate the
responsibilities of sperm storage facilities in order to effectively respond to reproductive trends in
modern society”).
108. Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Welcome to the Wild West: Protecting Access to Cross Border
Fertility Care in the United States, 22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 349, 361 (2012) (noting the United
States’ “well-documented if not completely deserved reputation as the Wild West of fertility treatment
because of its comparative lack of strong regulation of the multi-billion dollar fertility industry”);
Michael Ollove, States Not Eager to Regulate Fertility Industry, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Mar. 18,
2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2015/3/18/states-not-eager-toregulate-fertility-industry [https://perma.cc/DGY6-SAWW] (noting the federal and state governments in
the United States have done little to oversee the ART industry compared to many other industrialized
nations, which has led to the common description by many critics of the United States as “the Wild
West of the fertility industry”); Debora L. Spar, Fertility Industry Is a Wild West, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/09/13/making-laws-about-making-babies/fertilityindustry-is-a-wild-west [https://perma.cc/9CB6-DLJ7] (noting the United States lives in a “Wild West
of procreative possibility”).
109. Vanessa L. Pi, Regulating Sperm Donation: Why Requiring Exposed Donation Is Not the
Answer, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 379, 379 (2009) (noting the limited federal sperm donation
regulations and few, limited-scope state laws and regulations); Tamar Lewin, Sperm Banks Accused of
Losing
Samples
and
Lying
About
Donors,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
21,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/22/us/sperm-banks-accused-of-losing-samples-and-lying-aboutdonors.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/4J98-226A] (reporting on how “sperm banks are lightly regulated”).
110. See What You Should Know–Reproductive Tissue Donation, FDA (Nov. 5, 2010),
https://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/SafetyAvailability/TissueSafety/ucm232876.htm
[https://perma.cc/VUH5-JLM3] (noting Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) sperm bank regulations
are limited to requiring facilities to register with the FDA, requiring facilities to review a donor’s risk
factors for relevant communicable disease, and requiring facilities actually test donors for a limited
number of infectious diseases); Pi, supra note 109, at 379 (noting “there is currently little federal
regulation of sperm donation”).
111. 21 C.F.R. § 1271.75 (2006); What You Should Know–Reproductive Tissue Donation, supra note
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banks are not required by the federal government to actually test
sperm donor applicants for anything outside of this list of diseases.112
These regulations also do not require or impose on sperm banks any
standard of care or any duty to ART patients.113
There are some private, professional organizations, such as the
American Society of Reproductive Medicine (ASRM), the American
Association of Tissue Banks (AATB), and the American Fertility
Society (AFS) that attempt to address the problem of limited federal
regulations.114 The ASRM, AATB, and AFS issue more specific
guidelines for sperm banks, but sperm banks are not required to be
members of these organizations or comply with these guidelines.115
Thus, some states have created their own regulations for sperm banks
by requiring special state licensure and onsite inspections,116 but
Georgia has not implemented any special regulations specifically for
sperm banks outside of facility requirements.117 Georgia’s
Department of Community Health (the Department) only requires
sperm banks to have a general clinical laboratory license.118 The
Department’s requirements for the license include staff, record
keeping, collection, and storage requirements, as well as specific
education and experience requirements for the director of the lab and

110.
112. See 21 C.F.R. § 1271.75; What You Should Know–Reproductive Tissue Donation, supra note
110.
113. See 21 C.F.R. § 1271.75.
114. John K. Critser, Current Status of Semen Banking in the USA, 13 HUMAN REPRODUCTION 55, 55
(1998), http://humrep.oxfordjournals.org/content/13/suppl_2/55.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VCY-XKP7]
(noting “[g]uidelines for anonymous donor sperm banking practices have been established by the
American Society for Reproductive Medicine and standards have been established by the American
Association of Tissue Banks (AATB)”); Pi, supra note 109, at 387–88 (noting “[p]rofessional
organizations attempt to govern important aspects of the sperm donation process by publishing
standards and guidelines aimed at adequate screening, control over children per donor and monitoring of
a donor’s genetic and medical history”).
115. Pi, supra note 109, at 387 (noting sperm banks can choose to associate with these professional
organizations or not, so these guidelines are nonbinding suggestions).
116. Id. at 384 (noting some states have passed regulations requiring supervision by licensed
physicians, testing, licensing, and registration).
117. See GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 111-8-10-.17 (2016) (regulating sperm banks as a clinical laboratory
under healthcare facility regulations).
118. See id.
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certain employees within the lab.119 It also includes requirements for
documentation and three basic requirements for collecting donor
history.120 Similar to federal regulations, however, these regulations
also do not require or impose on sperm banks any standard of care or
any duty to ART patients.121
Thus, between federal and state regulations, sperm banks are
operating in the reproductive health care realm by providing services
for ART procedures, but they are not being held to the same
standards as the physicians they work alongside. Medical
professionals (physicians) are generally held to a higher standard of
care than nonprofessionals (sperm banks in this case) in negligence
actions.122 Under the law, physicians owe certain duties to their
patients that sperm banks do not owe to the same patients.123
Physicians have “a duty to use that degree of care and skill which is
expected of a reasonably competent practitioner in the same class to
which [the practitioner] belongs, acting in the same or similar
circumstances.”124 Without similar laws and regulations governing
sperm banks, it is difficult to determine what, if any, duty or standard
of care sperm banks must provide in their relationship with patients
using their services.125 This is important to note because even if
119. Id. (requiring that staff be “trained in the most current methods of cryobanking,” records contain
“a donor release and a complete history,” special identification codes be used in the storage process,
sperm be processed within one hour of collection, and directors and supervisors meet minimum training
and experience requirements).
120. Id. (requiring clinics document certain factors such as the criteria for assessing fertilization;
insemination schedules; the volume and quality of sperm used for insemination; requiring donor
histories to include an interview; examination of personal, physical, sexual, and genetic histories; and an
“examination of semen to ensure viability and motility, freedom from infection and/or foreign cells and
freezing survival capabilities”).
121. See id.
122. Fracassini, supra note 106, at 290.
123. Id.
124. Id. (quoting DOUGLAS K CUSINE, NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNIQUES: A LEGAL PROSPECTIVE
104 (1988)).
125. Id. Fracassini states the following:
A standard of care is difficult to define in the field of cryobanking because it is a new medical field that
lacks established guidelines and regulatory oversight. The only consistent source of standards are
guidelines promulgated by the AFS and the American Association of Tissue Banks (AATB). The
problem inherent in the use of these guidelines is that although adherence to these standards is strongly
suggested, it remains a voluntary decision.
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plaintiffs could validly bring a negligence action against a sperm
bank in Georgia, this reality—sperm banks seemingly having no
heightened professional duty to ART patients—may greatly impact
the court’s ability to find a duty and a breach, which would
ultimately determine the outcome of the lawsuit.
In Georgia, the lack of professional care and duty required of
sperm banks, combined with the courts’ prenatal torts analyses, has
created a gap in the law. The Xytex cases indicate families are unable
to hold sperm banks accountable for the health services they provide.
This combination essentially leaves no mechanism in place to
adequately protect Georgia citizens from negligent or fraudulent
business practices nor has the combination provided any mechanism
to hold the sperm banks accountable for the reproductive services
they offer to the public.
II. Analysis
As the use of ART increases,126 states must find a way to protect
their citizens while deterring sperm banks from operating under
negligent or fraudulent business practices. This issue is particularly
new for Georgia, but the Xytex cases demonstrate the need and
importance of reevaluating prenatal torts in the state.127 Part II of this
Note first compares Georgia’s refusal to recognize wrongful birth
claims with its acceptance of wrongful conception claims and then
analyzes the claims brought against Xytex in the Xytex cases, as well
as the lack of sperm bank regulations in Georgia.

Id.
126. Intrauterine Insemination, supra note 2.
127. Collins v. Xytex Corp., No. 2015CV259033, 2015 WL 6387328, at *3 (Ga. Super. Ct. Oct. 20,
2015). In Collins, the court mentions the time is ripe for a cause of action to be recognized that would
allow plaintiffs to pursue negligence claims against Xytex. Id.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol34/iss3/8

22

Posada: Whose Sperm Is It Anyways In The Wild, Wild West Of The Fertility

2018]

WILD WEST OF THE FERTILITY INDUSTRY

869

A. Comparing the Court’s Considerations for Wrongful
Conception in Graves with Wrongful Birth in Abelson
It is important to compare the Supreme Court of Georgia’s
reasoning for rejecting wrongful birth to its reasoning for accepting
wrongful conception to better understand where the Xytex cases fall
within prenatal torts. Six years after recognizing a cause of action for
wrongful conception in Graves, the court rejected the recognition of
wrongful birth in Abelson.128 However, the court wrote a much more
in-depth analysis regarding the policy considerations in Abelson than
it did in Graves.129 Given the amount of time the court devoted to
discussing the policy implications of recognizing wrongful birth in
Abelson, unlike wrongful conception in Graves, it seems the court
does not believe wrongful conception implicates the extensive policy
concerns that wrongful birth implicates and, vice versa, that wrongful
birth implicates more than the general policy concerns associated
with traditional torts that normally can be addressed in traditional tort
litigation.130 The policy considerations these prenatal torts implicate
include concerns regarding exposure to liability, recommendations
for abortions, the impact on the disabled community, and placing
valuations on the life of a child.
The court’s first policy consideration that prevented recognition of
wrongful birth but did not prevent the recognition of wrongful
conception is exposure to liability. Recognizing a cause of action for
wrongful conception does not raise judicial concerns regarding
increasing exposure to liability and medical malpractice claims
because wrongful conception focuses on an actual procedure the
128. Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Grp. v. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d 557, 557 (Ga. 1990); FultonDeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 314 S.E.2d 653, 653 (Ga. 1984).
129. Compare Abelson, 398 S.E.2d at 557–67 (declining to recognize wrongful birth as a valid cause
of action in a ten-page opinion), with Graves, 314 S.E.2d at 653–56 (recognizing wrongful conception
as a valid cause of action in a three-page opinion).
130. Compare Abelson, 398 S.E.2d at 560 nn.4–5, 563 n.9 (taking time to discuss the philosophical
implications on life and the policy implications on obstetricians’ liability exposure that would result
from recognizing a cause of action for wrongful birth), with Graves, 314 S.E.2d at 654 (discounting
policy concerns regarding liability exposure, remote injury, and out of proportion damages in two
sentences).
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medical practitioner conducts rather than what information the
practitioner discloses to the parents.131 In other words, wrongful
conception does not hold the practitioner accountable for anything
more than the procedure for which the practitioner should be held
accountable.132 The court expressed concern that wrongful birth, on
other hand, would create uncertainty surrounding what the
practitioner is required to disclose to the patient, increasing liability
exposure because practitioners could be sued for not disclosing
certain information they did not know they were required to
disclose.133
The court’s second policy consideration that prevented recognition
of wrongful birth but did not prevent the recognition of wrongful
conception follows from concerns regarding exposure liability:
abortion recommendations. Because wrongful conception does not
deal with disclosing information to patients and increasing liability,
the court is not concerned that practitioners would suggest the patient
get an abortion in order to protect themselves from liability, which is
a concern that exists for wrongful birth.134 The court’s third policy
consideration that prevented recognition of wrongful birth but did not
prevent the recognition of wrongful conception is the impact on the
disabled community. Generally, because wrongful conception cases
usually involve healthy children, not children with disabilities like in
wrongful birth cases, there is also no concern that recognizing the
131. See Graves, 314 S.E.2d at 654. The court notes damages that include the cost of the
“unsuccessful medical procedure which led to conception or pregnancy, for pain and suffering, medical
complications, costs of delivery, lost wages, and loss of consortium” are consistent with malpractice
cases and traditional tort remedies. Id. These damages focus on the procedure rather than what the
physician tells the patient. Id.
132. See id. (noting “[s]uch an action is no more than a species of malpractice which allows recovery
from a tortfeasor in the presence of an injury caused by intentional or negligent conduct”).
133. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d at 560 n.5, 563 n.9 (noting concerns that the uncertainty surrounding what
information must be disclosed to the patient to receive proper informed consent would cause an increase
of liability exposure and result in practitioners advising patients to undergo an abortion in order to avoid
liability).
134. Compare id. at 560 (defining wrongful birth as a claim for negligent treatment or advice, and
advice does implicate what the physician verbally discloses or suggests to the patient), with Graves, 314
S.E.2d at 654 (defining wrongful conception as a claim for negligently performing a sterilization or
abortion, and the focus on performance does not implicate what the physician verbally discloses or
suggest to the patient).
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cause of action would impact the disabled community in a negative
manner.135 Finally, unlike wrongful birth, the court does not think
policy concerns surrounding life and children are an issue in
wrongful conception claims because the focus is not the abortion of a
child; the focus is the failure of a procedure, and limited damages
excluding the costs of raising the child ensure the court does not
cross this line with calculations involving life or recognizing the
child as a burden.136
B. Applying the Court’s Considerations to the Xytex Cases
The Xytex cases are the first of their kind to implicate these
prenatal torts in an unexpected and detrimental way. These decisions
suggest it will be extremely difficult for parents to successfully bring
any claims—tort, contract, products liability, or otherwise—against a
sperm bank in Georgia because of how the state and federal courts
have analyzed such claims.137 Because the Xytex cases include
multiple state and federal cases that involve the same facts, the same
outcome, and similar arguments described in the Introduction, this
section will consider the judicial analysis in only two of these
cases—Collins v. Xytex and Doe 1 v. Xytex—to provide an example
of how the courts at the state and federal levels have used a
derivative analysis in these cases.

135. See Don C. Smith, Jr., supra note 46 (defining a wrongful birth action as one “brought by the
parents of a severely unhealthy child”); Kimberly D. Wilcoxon, Statutory Remedies for Judicial Torts:
The Need for Wrongful Birth Legislation, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1028 (2001) (defining wrongful
conception as actions where “there is usually no claim that the baby has birth defects, but merely that
the baby was born”).
136. Compare Abelson, 398 S.E.2d at 561–63 (finding a cause of action for wrongful birth is
unrecognizable because it necessarily deviates from traditional tort remedies by implicating questions of
abortion and valuations on life), with Graves, 314 S.E.2d at 654 (recognizing a cause of action for
wrongful conception that allows recovery for costs associated with the medical procedure because this
does not deviate from traditional tort remedies by implicating questions of abortion or the value of life).
137. See Collins v. Xytex Corp., No. 2015CV259033, 2015 WL 6387328, at *7 (Ga. Super. Ct. Oct.
20, 2015). The court dismissed tort, contract, and products liability claims by analyzing them all as
derivatives of a cause of action for wrongful birth, so whether there are any other claims that could be
brought that would not be susceptible to this derivative analysis is difficult to conceive. Id.
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1. Georgia’s Analysis of Claims as Derivatives of Wrongful
Birth
a. Collins v. Xytex
Although the plaintiffs in Collins did not bring any prenatal tort
claims against Xytex,138 the Fulton County Superior Court’s decision
to analyze each claim as a derivative of a wrongful birth claim
prevented the women from bringing any tort, contract, or products
liability claims against Xytex.139 The trial court primarily focused on
two aspects of the case: damages and the fact that the case involved a
planned pregnancy.140 First, the superior court determined that no
matter what tort or contract claims the plaintiff brings, all of these
claims are derivatives of a prenatal tort because the damages involve
a child.141 If the damages involve the birth of a child, this is the
signature of a prenatal tort no matter what the claims are disguised
as, so the claims must be treated as such given all of the social issues
and policy implications associated with evaluating the birth of a child
as a damage.142 Second, because the superior court determined these
claims were derivatives of a prenatal tort, the court needed to
determine which prenatal tort the claims were a derivate of: wrongful
birth or wrongful conception. The superior court acknowledged that
the plaintiffs were not claiming that but for Xytex they would have
aborted the child, but nevertheless, the fact that this was a planned
138. Id. at *1. The Collins’ claims included fraud, negligent misrepresentation, strict liability in
products liability, negligence in products liability, breach of express warranty, breach of an implied
warranty, battery, negligence, and unfair business practices. Id.
139. Id. at *7 (dismissing all tort, contracts, and products liability claims as impermissibly “rooted in
the concept of wrongful birth”).
140. See id. at *2 (reasoning the Collins’ claims were more similar to wrongful birth, even though
abortion was never an option since the sperm selection process is considered preconception, but because
the pregnancy was planned and concluded in an unwanted result—a child with genetic traits that the
family did not want—this aligns more with wrongful birth, although not perfectly).
141. Collins, 2015 WL 6387328, at *2 (noting “simple nomenclature cannot transform one type of
tort into another. Others have tried this approach in this context—and failed”).
142. Id. at *2 (finding “despite their alternative characterizations of Defendants’ allegedly tortious
actions, Plaintiffs at base are challenging the purported negligence that resulted in a wanted conception
with unwanted results. This claim most closely (though by no means perfectly) fits a claim for wrongful
birth—and so is not allowed”).
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pregnancy greatly impacted the court’s decision to classify the claims
as derivatives of wrongful birth claims.143 The court decided that,
because this situation involved a planned pregnancy and not an
unplanned pregnancy, the facts aligned more with a wrongful birth
claim rather than a wrongful conception claim.144 Accordingly, the
superior court dismissed all of the claims because Georgia does not
recognize wrongful birth as a cause of action.145
b. Doe 1 v. Xytex
Although the plaintiffs in Doe 1 did not bring any prenatal tort
claims against Xytex, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia’s decision to analyze each claim as a
derivative of a wrongful birth claim similarly prevented the plaintiffs
from being able to bring any tort, contract, fraud, or products liability
claims against Xytex.146 In Doe 1, however, the plaintiffs did attempt
to persuade the court that their case was one for wrongful conception
rather than wrongful birth, but the court was not satisfied with their
argument.147 The plaintiffs argued that “the functional differences
between [wrongful birth and wrongful conception] are (1) the timing
of the tort (i.e., pre- or post-conception), and (2) whether a
defendant’s actions directly or indirectly caused the injury.”148 Thus,
because the wrong here occurred prior to conception and directly
caused harm, the case is more similar to a wrongful conception case.
But, the district court chose to focus on damages to evaluate the
plaintiffs’ argument. The court stated, “The true difference between
[wrongful birth and wrongful conception] is the measure of
143. Id. at *2 (noting Georgia defines wrongful conception as a situation involving a sterilization
procedure and an unplanned pregnancy, and this case does not present such a claim).
144. Id.
145. Id. at *7.
146. See Doe 1 v. Xytex Corp., No. 1:16-CV-1453-TWT, 2017 WL 1036484, at *2–3 (N.D. Ga. Mar.
17, 2017) (dismissing the eleven claims as derivatives of wrongful birth); Complaint, supra note 8, at
21–29 (listing the eleven causes of action as follows: fraud, negligent misrepresentation, strict liability,
products liability negligence, breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, battery,
negligence, unfair business practices, specific performance, and false advertising).
147. Doe 1, 2017 WL 1036484, at *2.
148. Id.
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damages,” not the timing of the tort and whether the injury was
direct, as suggested by the plaintiffs, and the court disfavors wrongful
birth claims specifically “because they require the court to decide
between the value of a life with disabilities and the value of no life at
all.”149 With this in mind, the court determined no matter how the
plaintiffs attempted to describe the situation, avoiding the use of the
donor’s sperm would not mean the plaintiffs’ children would be
healthier.150 It would mean the child would not exist, which is the
essence of a wrongful birth claim.151 Thus, the district court
dismissed all of the claims because Georgia does not recognize
wrongful birth.152
2. Why the Xytex Cases Are Different from Abelson and Graves
The issue presented in the Xytex cases is different than what
Georgia courts have experienced with prenatal torts thus far because
the cases do not fit squarely into one of the above-described prenatal
tort claims. Wrongful birth cases involve planned pregnancies,
postconception negligence, indirect causation, and unhealthy
children, whereas wrongful conception cases involve unplanned
pregnancies, preconception negligence, direct causation, and healthy
children.153 The Xytex cases, however, involve a planned pregnancy
(a signature of wrongful birth), preconception negligence (a signature
of wrongful conception), and otherwise healthy children (a signature
of wrongful conception). Therefore, the Xytex cases involve
elements of both wrongful birth and wrongful conception. The
courts, however, have not considered all of these elements. In
Collins, the superior court placed heavy emphasis on the fact that this
was a planned pregnancy.154 Although a planned pregnancy is more
149. Id. at *3.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Mahoney, supra note 42, at 775.
154. See Collins v. Xytex Corp., No. 2015CV259033, 2015 WL 6387328, at *2 (Ga. Super. Ct. Oct.
20, 2015).
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consistent with the court’s understanding of wrongful birth claims
than wrongful conception claims, this should not be the sole
determining factor in analyzing these claims as derivatives of
wrongful birth. In Doe 1, the district court placed a heavy emphasis
on the damages being the children’s nonexistence.155 While defining
a child’s life as a damage is more consistent with the court’s
understanding of wrongful birth claims than with wrongful
conception claims, again, this should not be the sole determining
factor in analyzing these claims as derivatives of wrongful birth.
If Georgia courts are going to analyze claims against a sperm bank
as derivatives of prenatal torts, all of the above signature elements
should be considered, not just one element, because they all implicate
the Supreme Court of Georgia’s initial considerations that resulted in
the Abelson and Graves decisions. Thus, in order to determine which
prenatal tort the Xytex cases are most similar to, the following four
factors must be considered: (1) the timing of the tort relative to
conception, (2) causation, (3) the health of the child, and (4)
damages. When accounting for all of these factors, it is clear the
Xytex cases align with wrongful conception more than with wrongful
birth because they involve the following: (1) preconception conduct,
(2) a direct cause, (3) a healthy child, and (4) damages that can be
limited to not include the cost of the child.
a. Timing: Preconception Versus Postconception
The first element that must be considered is the timing of the tort
relative to conception: does the case involve preconception or
postconception conduct? The plaintiffs in these cases are focused on
the negligence that occurred preconception, not postconception,
which aligns more with a claim for wrongful conception. The
plaintiffs are not arguing that, but for Xytex, they would have aborted
the child. They are arguing that, but for Xytex, they would not have
conceived the child to begin with.156 In other words, the basis of the
155. Doe 1, 2017 WL 1036484, at *3.
156. Collins, 2015 WL 6387328, at *1. Plaintiffs’ contention in Collins is “had they known the true
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argument is not that, had Xytex disclosed true information about the
donor, the plaintiffs would have opted for an abortion. Instead, the
basis of the argument is that, had Xytex taken appropriate steps to
ensure the donor was indeed the person the company was advertising,
Xytex would have learned the donor was not a match before the
intrauterine insemination procedure. This would have resulted in the
plaintiffs not proceeding with the donor selection and ART procedure
and, hence, never reaching conception. Thus, Xytex’s negligence
occurred preconception. Although the Supreme Court of Georgia did
not explicitly discuss the differences between preconception and
postconception in Abelson and Graves, this factor is important
because it implicates the other considerations in Abelson and Graves,
which impacted the Xytex decisions.
When the plaintiffs in Doe 1 attempted to focus on the fact that
this was a preconception issue, the district court equated their
argument—that the plaintiffs would have never used the sperm to
conceive—with the fact that this essentially means the children
would not exist, which makes the case a wrongful birth case.157 This
conclusion, however, is a fallacy because anyone could arrive at the
same conclusion for a true wrongful conception case: if the physician
conducted the sterilization procedure correctly, this essentially means
the child would not exist. The court’s analysis completely disregards
the fact that it can limit damages. In Graves, it was precisely because
wrongful conception can also be viewed as defining the child as a
damage that the Supreme Court of Georgia specifically limited
damages so that it could recognize wrongful conception as a prenatal
tort that fits within the bounds of the traditional tort analysis.158 The
court decided to limit damages in order to focus on the procedure and
decided not to include damages for raising the child so that it could
recognize a claim without implicating questions regarding the child’s
characteristics of BGM 9623 when they should have—that is, at the time Xytex rendered its services—
A.C. would not have been conceived.” Id. (emphasis in original); see also Doe 1, 2017 WL 1036484, at
*2. Plaintiffs’ contention in Doe 1 is that the case is one for wrongful conception. Id.
157. Doe 1, 2017 WL 1036484, at *3.
158. See Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 314 S.E.2d 653, 654–55 (Ga. 1984).
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existence. Thus, the fact that the children would not exist, on its own,
neither negates the reality that the issue at hand occurred
preconception, nor does it automatically make the case one for
wrongful birth. The other elements must also be analyzed to
determine which prenatal tort these cases most align with.
b. Causation: Direct Causation Versus Indirect Causation
The second element that must be considered is causation: does the
case involve direct causation or indirect causation? Courts can find
direct causation in the Xytex cases, which aligns more with a claim
for wrongful conception. In Abelson, the Supreme Court of Georgia
determined causation cannot be met in a wrongful birth claim
because a physician cannot be the cause of a genetic condition
inherited by the child.159 The court expressed concerns that finding
such attenuated, indirect causation would increase medical
malpractice claims and liability exposure.160 The Xytex plaintiffs,
however, were not simply trying to hold a person accountable for an
inherited genetic condition because the children in those cases were
healthy.161 Instead, the plaintiffs were trying to hold a company
accountable for its direct actions that constituted a significant part of
the ART procedures the plaintiffs received.
Recognizing the plaintiffs’ claims against Xytex would not
increase exposure to liability due to attenuated causation because the
claims’ focus is on Xytex’s actual sperm donation procedures. The
plaintiffs argued Xytex had an obligation to not participate in
fraudulent business practices and to match the plaintiffs with sperm
donors who met specific qualifications like the company advertised.
Xytex breached that obligation by not thoroughly investigating their
donors—as Xytex claims it does—falsely advertising specific donor
159. Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Grp. v. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d 557, 561 (Ga. 1990).
160. Id. at 560 n.5.
161. See Collins, 2015 WL 6387328, at *4 (noting the child’s current healthy state, “Plaintiffs do not
allege a present injury but rather an apprehension of a future injury to A.C.—that he may in time
become schizophrenic”); Complaint, supra note 8, at 30 (including a medical monitoring fund in the
prayer for relief to monitor the child’s health).
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qualifications, encouraging the applicant to lie about his credentials
in order to get his sperm to sell, and matching the plaintiffs with a
donor who was not who Xytex said he was.162 Xytex’s breach
resulted in the plaintiffs selecting one specific donor for their ART
procedures. Had Xytex not breached its legal obligations, the families
would never have been matched with this donor for their ART
procedures. In other words, Xytex’s actions directly resulted in the
selection and pairing of the donor with the plaintiffs. This causation
is direct, not attenuated, because Xytex’s business involves providing
an essential component of ART procedures; without sperm, an
intrauterine procedure cannot be conducted.163 Thus, the plaintiffs are
not trying to hold the sperm bank accountable for anything more than
its part in an ART procedure for which the sperm bank should be
held accountable. Further, recognizing the plaintiffs’ claims against
Xytex would not increase medical malpractice claims because the
plaintiffs are suing a company for its services, not the physician
conducting the medical procedure.
Finally, the court was also concerned that, because finding
causation would increase liability exposure, it would also incentivize
practitioners to recommend abortions in order to protect themselves
against liability.164 In the Xytex cases, however, recognizing the
plaintiffs’ claims against Xytex would not incentivize practitioners to
recommend abortions because these cases involve the sperm bank
providing services for the procedure, not the practitioner performing
the ART procedure. Further, at this point in the process—sperm
donor selection—the child has not even been conceived yet, so
abortion is not an option. All of these factors mirror a claim for
wrongful conception.

162. Complaint, supra note 8, at 6–8, 10–11, 13, 29.
163. Intrauterine Insemination: IUI, supra note 2.
164. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d at 563 n.9.
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c. Health: A Healthy Child Versus an Unhealthy Child
The third element that must be considered is the health of the
child: is the child healthy or unhealthy? The children in the Xytex
cases are currently healthy, which aligns more with wrongful
conception. As mentioned above, these children were born healthy,
not with any serious genetic disability, and a healthy child is
indicative of a wrongful conception claim, not a wrongful birth
claim.165 This factor is important because it implicates one of the
Supreme Court of Georgia’s major policy considerations in Abelson
and Graves: the policy implications surrounding life. Doe 1
summarized this concern by stating, “Wrongful birth claims are
disfavored because they require the court to decide between the value
of a life with disabilities and the value of no life at all.”166
In the Xytex cases, however, recognizing the plaintiffs’ claims
against Xytex would not impact the disabled community negatively
because the children are currently healthy. It can be argued that
because the families sought funds to monitor the children’s health for
the development of an impairment,167 this would still negatively
impact the disabled community because the court would be placing a
value on the costs associated with caring for a child that might
develop an impairment. It is possible, however, for the courts to
avoid this issue altogether. If the courts chose to analyze the claims
as wrongful conception claims, the families would not be allowed to
seek such damages because wrongful conception damages exclude
future costs of raising the child.168 Allowing such future costs is what
sends a message to the disabled community that a disabled life is
somehow less valuable than no life at all. If the families’ damages
only included those allowed in a wrongful conception claim—costs
165. Mahoney, supra note 42, at 775.
166. Doe 1 v. Xytex Corp., No. 1:16-CV-01453-TWT, 2017 WL 1036484, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 17,
2017).
167. Collins v. Xytex Corp., No. 2015CV259033, 2015 WL 6387328, at *4 (Ga. Super. Ct. Oct. 20,
2015); Complaint, supra note 8, at 30.
168. See Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 314 S.E.2d 653, 655 (Ga. 1984) (finding damages in
a wrongful conception claim do not include the costs of raising the child).
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for the procedure, medical complications, and delivery—the family
would not be receiving any costs associating the child’s possible
development of a disability with the damage. Families would only be
receiving costs for the services they were sold that turned out not to
be what they contracted for. Thus, the courts would not be sending a
message to the disabled community that the disabled life is somehow
less valuable. This ties into the fourth element: damages.
d. Damages: Including the Child Versus Excluding the Child
The final element that must be considered is damages: does a
finding of damages require including the cost of the child as a
damage? Damages in the Xytex cases can be limited to not include
the cost of the child, which aligns more with wrongful conception.
As mentioned above, damages implicate one of the Supreme Court of
Georgia’s major policy considerations in Abelson and Graves: the
policy implications surrounding life. All of the courts in these cases
have referenced the Supreme Court of Georgia’s refusal to recognize
that a child’s life amounts to a legal injury because of the policy
implications.169 However, these policy concerns are not a problem in
the Xytex cases because the issue in these cases is not the abortion of
an unhealthy child; the main issue is a company’s failure to provide
the services the plaintiffs agreed to. The harm in a wrongful
conception case is the impact on the woman’s right to plan the size of
her family, not the child.170 Similarly, here, the harm is not the child.
The harm is the impact on women’s right to make an informed
decision regarding the procreative options available to them, which
included ART procedures that required the selection of a sperm
donor and insemination with the sperm of a person to whom the
women have consented. This aligns with the basis of a wrongful
conception claim.
169. See id.; Abelson, 398 S.E.2d at 559; Collins, 2015 WL 6387328, at * 2; Doe 1, 2017 WL
1036484, at *3.
170. See Graves, 314 S.E.2d at 654 (noting that in Roe v. Wade the United States Supreme Court
“recognized that a woman has the right to plan the size of her family,” and choosing to recognize a
claim for wrongful conception regardless of the practical considerations raised).
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Although the plaintiffs did request costs for monitoring the
children for the development of any mental impairment as they get
older, this was only one line item in the damages sought and is one
that the court can limit.171 The Supreme Court of Georgia’s
recognition of wrongful conception in Graves provides the perfect
example of how courts can recognize claims via limited damages
because the court chose to recognize the plaintiffs’ claims even
though they asked for future child-rearing costs. By limiting damages
to exclude the costs of raising a child, wrongful conception ensures
the court does not cross a philosophical line with calculations
involving life or recognizing the child as a burden. The same
argument and method can be applied in the Xytex cases.
Overall, the Xytex cases align more closely with wrongful
conception because they do not implicate all of the policy concerns
that prevented the Supreme Court of Georgia from recognizing
wrongful birth. The underlying focus of wrongful conception is a
procedure that results in an outcome that is not consistent with what
the patient consented to.172 Although the Xytex cases do not involve
a sterilization procedure or an abortion procedure, they involve
intrauterine insemination procedures that were not consistent with
what the women consented to in preparation for the procedure.173
C. Georgia’s Lack of Regulation
Whether the Xytex claims are analyzed as derivatives of any
prenatal tort, however, requires returning to the issue of sperm bank
171. Complaint, supra note 8, at 30. Plaintiffs sought damages for pain and suffering, financial losses,
attorneys’ fees, costs of the lawsuit, a medical monitoring fund, injunctive relief, and punitive damages.
Id.
172. See Mahoney, supra note 42, at 775 (noting wrongful conception can encompass more
procedures than sterilization and abortion, such as contraception administration and preconception
genetic testing).
173. Collins, 2015 WL 6387328, at *1. In Collins, Plaintiffs consented to a sperm donor with specific
qualities for their intrauterine insemination. Id. Defendants reassured Plaintiffs that they were getting
sperm with those specific qualities, but, in fact, Plaintiffs were not. Id.; see also Complaint, supra note
8, at 8–10. Similarly, in Doe 1, Plaintiffs consented to a sperm donor with specific qualities for their
artificial insemination, and Defendants reassured Plaintiffs that they were getting sperm with those
specific qualities, but, in fact, Plaintiffs were not. Id.
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regulation. If contract, tort, and products liability claims are all
analyzed as derivatives of a prenatal tort, plaintiffs would need to
satisfy the four elements of the traditional tort analysis to succeed in
any of their claims. As mentioned in Part I, the first element that
plaintiffs must satisfy is duty. The Supreme Court of Georgia has
found a duty in wrongful birth and wrongful conception claims
because medical practitioners have a duty to disclose information
regarding genetic deformities to their patients, and medical
practitioners have a duty to perform the medical procedure agreed
to.174 Sperm banks, however, do not have the same duties as medical
practitioners because they are not regulated in the same manner.
As discussed in Part I, federal sperm bank regulations are limited
to requiring sperm banks to conduct screening for a limited number
of diseases, leaving it up to the states to implement regulations
requiring more stringent sperm bank standards, duties, and methods
of donor screening. While Georgia requires sperm banks to have a
clinical laboratory license, the regulations governing these licenses
only set standards for the operation of the lab, the education of the
employees in the lab, and documentation processes.175 This
regulation does not set any additional sperm bank standards or donor
screening requirements, nor does the regulation create any
heightened or professional duty, relationship, or standard of care
between a sperm bank and the ART patients.176 It is important to note
that whether a plaintiff can prove a sperm bank has certain duties to
the patient undergoing the ART procedure is yet to be seen and might
be hindered by this lack of regulation. Even if courts find a duty
exists, it still might be difficult to prove the sperm bank breached its
duty during the sperm bank’s donor screening, selection, and
matching processes because the sperm bank’s standard of care when
conducting these processes will likely be that which is considered
reasonable within the industry. Thus, courts could find that Xytex is

174. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d at 560–61.
175. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 111-8-10.17 (2016).
176. Id.
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acting reasonably in accordance with industry standards because the
industry basically has no standards.
III. Proposal
Prenatal torts are extremely complex because of the many policy
concerns involved with these claims; however, precisely because of
their complexity, this area of the law cannot be ignored as ART
continues to advance. The Xytex cases exemplify just how important
it is for the law to advance with technology. The Xytex cases allege
that Xytex not only negligently paired the plaintiffs with a donor who
was not what Xytex advertised, but also intentionally suggested to
the donor that he falsify his application according to what sperm sells
best on the market.177 Although such business practices should be
considered unacceptable, it is no surprise that Xytex might engage in
these practices considering the company can presumably charge
higher rates for sperm donors with higher qualifications.178
Xytex’s attempt to transfer the cases filed against the company in
other states to Georgia—its principal place of business and home to
its headquarters—and its attempt to consolidate all the federal cases
in Georgia179 indicate the company may purposefully be hiding from
the law in a state that lacks the pistols for a duel. Georgia should no
longer harbor such outlaws by allowing them to take advantage of
state laws at the expense of individual rights, not even out of a desire
to limit the regulation of businesses. Solving this issue while
accounting for the complex public policy concerns, however, will
take a multi-branch approach. Thus, this Note proposes a
combination of (1) the Georgia judiciary’s acceptance of certain
claims in the Xytex cases and an expansion of the wrongful
177. Complaint, supra note 8, at 10–11.
178. Pricing, XYTEX CRYO INT’L, https://www.xytex.com/patient-information/pricing/
[https://perma.cc/JL6N-CJCT] (last visited Sept. 25, 2016) (charging more expensive rates for patients
to obtain premium access to the company’s enhanced donor profiles to select their sperm donor).
179. See Doe v. Xytex Corp., No. C 16-02935 WHA, 2016 WL 3902577, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 19,
2016) (Xytex moving to transfer the case to the Southern District of Georgia); In re Xytex Corp. Sperm
Donor Prod. Liab. Litig., 223 F. Supp. 3d 1351, 1352–53 (J.P.M.L. 2016) (Xytex moving to centralize
pretrial proceedings in this litigation in the Northern District of Georgia).
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conception claim to include more than sterilization procedures, and
(2) the Georgia General Assembly’s implementation of more
stringent state laws governing sperm banks.
A. Accepting Certain Claims and Expanding Wrongful
Conception
First, in order to compensate families and to hold companies like
Xytex accountable for their procedures, Georgia courts should
change their analysis of claims against sperm banks. Instead of
analyzing these claims as derivatives of wrongful birth, the court
should take the following dual approach: (1) analyze the plaintiff’s
claims as claims that already have limited damages built into them
rather than as derivative claims, and (2) analyze only the remaining
claims that do not already have limited damages as derivatives of
wrongful conception. If the courts adopted this dual approach, it
would give the Xytex families the opportunity to bring all of their
claims against Xytex.
First, as discussed in Parts I and II, the Georgia courts’ main
reason for differentiating between wrongful birth and wrongful
conception is the issue of damages because of the policy implications
that arise from recognizing a child as a damage. Thus, the Supreme
Court of Georgia recognizes wrongful conception specifically
because of the limited damages. Some of the claims the Xytex parties
brought, however, already have limited damages built into the claim.
For example, in Doe 1, the plaintiffs brought a cause of action for
unfair business practices under the Georgia Fair Business Act
(GFBA).180 Under the GFBA, individuals have a private right to sue
a company for unfair business practices to recover injunctive relieve,
general damages, and exemplary damages where the violation was
intentional.181 Because the GFBA does not allow plaintiffs to recover
special damages, the damages would already be limited to the direct
and necessary damages—pain and suffering, emotional distress, and
180. Complaint, supra note 8, at 27.
181. O.C.G.A. § 10-1-399 (2018).
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the cost of the services.182 Such claims already limit the damages in
the same manner as wrongful conception, so courts could analyze
these claims as-is rather than as a derivative of a prenatal tort because
the damages will not implicate political questions regarding life.
Other claims the plaintiffs brought, such as the products liability
and tort claims, do not have limited damages.183 Thus, these claims
could potentially invoke damages that classify the child as an injury.
Rather than just outright dismissing these claims, however, the court
could analyze these claims as wrongful conception derivatives in
order to achieve their limited damages goals. The Georgia judiciary
can accomplish this by expanding wrongful conception similar to
what Minnesota and North Carolina courts have done.
1. Adopting the Minnesota and North Carolina Wrongful
Conception Approach
Given that the Xytex cases align more with wrongful conception
than wrongful birth, the Georgia courts should expand wrongful
conception to encompass preconception negligence in assisted
reproductive procedures and could do so without disrupting
Georgia’s policy concerns. In Minnesota and North Carolina, a claim
similarly consisting of both wrongful birth and wrongful conception
characteristics shows that courts can classify these situations as
derivatives of wrongful conception instead of wrongful birth.
Minnesota and North Carolina are similar to Georgia because these
states also recognize a prenatal tort for wrongful conception while
refusing to recognize a prenatal tort for wrongful birth.184 Both of
these states considered the same policy concerns as Georgia in
deciding not to recognize wrongful birth. The Minnesota legislature
182. See Damages, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (differentiating between general
damages as those damages that are so reasonably expected they do not require proof and special
damages as particular or extraordinary damages that must be proven).
183. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-2 (2018) (defining the damages allowed in tort actions under Georgia law,
which include both general damages and special damages).
184. Mahoney, supra note 42, at 784–785 (analyzing Minnesota and North Carolina as states that do
not recognize wrongful birth but do recognize a broad interpretation of wrongful conception).
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completely banned wrongful birth presumably because the legislature
believes it is never appropriate to consider the birth of a child as a
damage.185 The North Carolina Supreme Court came to the same
conclusion as Georgia: given all of the policy implications and
consequences of recognizing such an action, it is the responsibility of
the state legislature to determine whether such an action should
exist.186
The wrongful conception prenatal tort in Minnesota and North
Carolina, however, encompasses more than just sterilization and
abortion procedures.187 It also includes pregnancy diagnoses,
contraceptive administration, and negligent genetic testing.188 In
recent years, several states have addressed negligent preconception
genetic testing, another prenatal claim that has arisen due to advances
in genetic testing technology.189 This prenatal claim is also defined
by a combination of wrongful birth and wrongful conception
characteristics. It typically involves a planned pregnancy resulting in
the birth of an unhealthy child (i.e., wrongful birth), but it also
involves negligence that occurs preconception (i.e., wrongful
conception).190 Some states have been analyzing this claim as a
derivative of wrongful birth because the situation involves a planned
185. See Duncan, supra note 41, at 6–7 (analyzing Minnesota within a list of other states that
specifically deny claims for wrongful birth by statute).
186. Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 537 (N.C. 1985).
The General Assembly of North Carolina, as a coordinate and equal branch
of our government, is better suited than this Court to address the issues
raised by this case. Only that body can provide an appropriate forum for a
full and open debate of all of the issues arising from the related theories of
“wrongful” birth and “wrongful” life. Unlike courts of law, the General
Assembly can address all of the issues at one time and do so without being
required to attempt to squeeze its results into the mold of conventional tort
concepts which clearly do not fit.
Id.
187. Mahoney, supra note 42, at 784 (noting “[t]hese states have expanded wrongful conception from
the contexts of negligent sterilizations, abortions, pregnancy diagnoses, or contraceptive administration,
to circumstances involving negligent genetic testing”).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 775–76.
190. Id. (noting “[b]ecause this strain of parental claims factually implicates aspects associated with
both wrongful birth and wrongful conception, courts have varied in their approaches to this specific
prenatal issue”).
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pregnancy and an unhealthy child.191 Minnesota and North Carolina,
however, have instead expanded the wrongful conception claim to
encompass these situations because negligent preconception genetic
testing involves negligence that occurs before conception.192 Even
though these states do not recognize wrongful birth, the state courts
have been able to expand wrongful conception while balancing
policy concerns to adapt to technological advances. The Xytex cases
(which involve preconception negligence, direct liability, and healthy
children) involve more characteristics of wrongful conception than
negligent preconception genetic testing cases (which only involve
preconception negligence). Thus, the Xytex cases arguably align
more with wrongful conception than negligent preconception genetic
testing does, which favors the expansion of wrongful conception in
Georgia.
The Georgia courts could follow Minnesota and North Carolina by
focusing on the fact that the negligent act occurred preconception,
and it involves direct liability, an otherwise healthy child, and
damages that courts can limit to the cost of the sperm bank’s
services, the ART procedure, or both. Had the sperm bank acted
reasonably in its donor screening process, the plaintiffs would never
have conceived their children because the donor did not match the
plaintiffs’ application preferences. Thus, the donor would not have
been selected for their ART procedure. In other words, but for
Xytex’s negligence in processing sperm donors and matching them
with applications, the children would never have been conceived.
Minnesota and North Carolina are examples of how state courts can
expand the wrongful conception analysis without impacting the
policy concerns that the courts and legislature took into consideration
when deciding not to recognize wrongful birth.

191. Id.
192. Id. at 785 (noting “[t]hough negligent preconception genetic testing appears to involve aspects
associated with the wrongful birth action, the courts in these two states label these claims as wrongful
conception”).
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2. Accounting for Previous Policy Concerns
This dual approach would account for the policy concerns that the
Supreme Court of Georgia considered in Abelson and Graves: the
policy implications regarding life, increasing medical malpractice
lawsuits, and increasing liability. First, for those claims that already
have limited damages, plaintiffs would not be able to recover
damages for the cost of raising the child, so the claims would not
implicate valuations of life or send a negative message regarding life
to the disabled community.
Second, regardless of what damages are normally allowed in the
remaining claims, the damages would automatically be limited to
wrongful conception damages because the court would analyze the
claims as derivatives of wrongful conception. Thus, the damages
would be limited to expenses for the “medical procedure which led to
conception or pregnancy, for pain and suffering, medical
complications, costs of delivery, lost wages, and loss of
consortium.”193 This protects against crossing the line into wrongful
birth territory where damages include a valuation on life and
negatively impact the disabled community. Although families will
not obtain all of the costs they originally wanted (e.g., the costs of
monitoring the child’s health), this will at least provide an avenue to
receive some costs associated with their ART procedures and hold
companies like Xytex accountable for their actions.
Third, since the lawsuits are against the sperm banks, not the
physicians, there is no concern that this would result in an increase in
medical malpractice lawsuits. Lastly, while this approach would
increase liability for sperm banks, sperm banks should be at risk for
liability because they are currently participating in ART procedures
in a fairly unregulated manner and without liability risks.

193. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 314 S.E.2d 653, 654 (Ga. 1984).
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3. Accounting for New Policy Concerns
Although the original policy concerns would be accounted for,
new policy concerns might arise. First, allowing plaintiffs to bring
products liability claims against sperm banks might present a moral
and ethical dilemma by considering sperm a “product.” Under a
products liability analysis, several theories of liability require a
showing of a defective product.194 Finding an individual’s sperm
“defective” because of a mental illness, a disability, a disease, or a
criminal history might negatively impact several communities that
are already stigmatized (e.g., the mentally ill community, the
disabled community, and the ex-convict community). However, if the
courts apply the method described above, they can avoid implicating
such moral and ethical questions. Products liability claims would
likely fall under the category of claims that do not already have
limited damages, so the court would analyze the claims as derivatives
of wrongful conception. In conducting the traditional wrongful
conception analysis there is no discussion regarding whether a
product is defective, so the court would not need to engage in a
question of whether an individual’s sperm is defective. The focus
would remain on the sperm bank’s screening and matching processes
and the harm to the woman’s right to make an informed decision
regarding the procreative options available to her.
Another policy concern is whether allowing plaintiffs to bring
these claims against sperm banks would open the floodgates of
litigation. Sperm banks allow individuals to select sperm donors with
very specific qualities ranging from eye color to education level.
Allowing plaintiffs to bring suit against sperm banks might open the
door to lawsuits for discrepancies over minor donor characteristics
such as eye color. However, in anonymous donor cases like the
Xytex cases, the families usually never find out the name of the
donor. Thus, unless a company makes a mistake, families that use
anonymous sperm donors likely will not find out if any discrepancies
194. Product Liability, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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between the donor and the donor’s application actually exist. But,
families would need to learn about a discrepancy in order to file a
lawsuit over the discrepancy, so an essential component required for
opening the floodgates of litigation is unlikely to occur. Further,
arguments distinguishing between breaches of material donor
characteristics that actually cause harm to the woman’s right to make
an informed decision regarding the procreative options available to
her versus breaches of immaterial donor characteristics that do not
cause such harm can be dealt with in the course of traditional
litigation.
B. Georgia Regulations
While the judiciary should alter its approach to the Xytex cases,
this change might not be enough to solve the problem. As mentioned
in Part II, finding duty and breach in these cases might be difficult
without any laws in place that establish the sperm bank’s duty to
ART patients. This could impact the court’s analysis of any claims
that are derivatives of wrongful conception by making it difficult for
the court to find duty and breach. Further, sperm banks offer
anonymous sperm donations, such as the donations in the Xytex
cases. The only reason the plaintiffs discovered the truth about their
donor is because Xytex accidentally notified them of the donor’s true
identity, and from there, the plaintiffs conducted their own
investigation. Thus, the only reason the plaintiffs were even able to
bring suits against Xytex in the first place was all because of an
accident. This begs the question: how many other families have been
impacted by Xytex’s misrepresentations and negligence? While
changing the judicial analysis would allow the courts to ensure
accountability and compensation in the Xytex cases, that same
accountability and compensation would not be afforded to any other
families that Xytex paired with false donor applications unbeknownst
to the families. If the state only changes the judicial analysis, Xytex
could continue their unacceptable practices because they can simply
hide behind anonymous donors, gambling on the reality that no other
suits will be brought against them because anonymous donors usually
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remain anonymous. In other words, the chance of any other families
finding out that their donor was not who Xytex advertised them to be
is very limited. Therefore, to protect all families using sperm
donations, it is important for the Georgia General Assembly to
affirmatively establish explicit duties and standards that sperm banks
are legally required to follow.
The Georgia General Assembly should adopt laws that both
expand a sperm bank’s duties during the donor screening process and
establish a duty owed to ART patients. To expand a sperm bank’s
duties during the donor screening process, the legislature should pass
a law that requires sperm banks to develop reasonable measures to
ensure a sperm donor is not lying on the application to become a
sperm donor. Such measures could include conducting background
checks and employment verification for all donor applicants, as well
as conducting multiple in-person interviews of donor applicants. The
legislature should also establish procedures in the event that, at some
point after accepting the donor applicant as a sperm donor, the sperm
bank discovers a major discrepancy with a material fact used to
advertise and promote the donor (e.g., the donor does not have
certain illnesses, diseases, or a felony record). Such procedures could
include requirements for sperm banks to immediately update the
sperm donor’s profile with the relevant information and immediately
notify sperm recipients who were matched or are about to be matched
with that sperm donor.
To establish a duty owed to the ART patients, the AFS and AATB
have suggested legislatures pass laws that hold sperm banks to
standards similar to those imposed on doctors.195 Because sperms
banks are operating in a field required for advanced reproductive
medical procedures, the legislature should pass a law that establishes
sperm banks owe a heightened duty to ART patients, which includes
a professional standard of care, rather than the reasonable standard of
care found within the industry. The legislature could also use this
opportunity to include in the law a private cause of action against
195. Fracassini, supra note 106, at 302–04.
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sperm banks that breach the specified duty, for which damages shall
exclude any costs associated with raising or caring for the child.
CONCLUSION
The United States is known as the Wild, Wild West of the fertility
industry for a reason, and as sperm banks continue to take advantage
of the lack of federal regulations, the pressure will fall on the states to
remedy the situation. The combination of an inability to pursue
adequate legal claims against a sperm bank and no regulations
implementing adequate sperm bank standards essentially leaves no
mechanism in place to protect individual rights. No one is holding the
sperm banks accountable for the reproductive procedures they
facilitate. By shifting the analysis to a wrongful conception analysis
and creating sperm banks regulations, Georgia has an opportunity to
not only remedy the situation, but to lead the nation in reigning in the
Wild, Wild West.
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